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In December of 2020, President Trump issued an executive 
order on “Promoting Beautiful Federal Civic Architecture,” a 
draft of which was leaked to the press in February under the title, 
“Making Federal Buildings Beautiful Again.” The order provided 
for updating the Guiding Principles of the General Services 
Administration’s Design Excellence Program to promote the use of 
“classical and traditional architectural styles,” which “have 
proven their ability to inspire…respect for our system of self-
government.” According to the order, there would have been a 
presumption against the use of such modern architectural styles as 
Brutalism and Deconstructivism in the construction of new federal 
public buildings, as these styles, according to Trump, fail to 
convey “the dignity, enterprise, vigor, and stability of America’s 
system of self-government.” The order was troubling in that it 
proposed an official style that would have amounted to a 
censorship regime. Had it not been quickly rescinded by President 
Biden, the order would have deprived many architects and other 
interested parties of their First Amendment rights. One can also 
imagine a follow-up order calling for all new federal buildings—
which belong to the public—to be decorated in twenty-four karat 
 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, 2021, University of Pennsylvania Law School; 
Doctor of Fine Arts, Dramaturgy and Dramatic Criticism, Yale School of 
Drama. I am most grateful to Seth Kreimer and Tobias Wolff for helpful 
comments and conversations about previous drafts. All errors are my own.  
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gold leaf and marble. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the 
question of whether architecture can be considered a form of 
constitutionally protected “speech.” However, as an expressive 
art, architecture should without question be among the forms 
protected by the First Amendment. In this article, I explore the 
First Amendment implications of Trump’s proposed order, the 
limits on the public’s ability to use the First Amendment to contest 
offensive government speech, and the ways in which existing law 
fails to reckon with the unique limitations and possibilities of 
architecture. 
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During President Trump’s first Senate impeachment trial, a draft of 
an executive order under consideration was leaked to the press. 
Titled “Making Federal Buildings Beautiful Again,” the draft 
proposed updating the Guiding Principles of the General Services 
Administration’s Design Excellence Program to promote the use of 
“classical and traditional architectural styles,” which “have proven 
their ability to inspire…respect for our system of self-
government.”1 According to the draft, modern architectural styles 
such as Brutalism and Deconstructivism, which fail to “convey[] 
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the dignity, enterprise, vigor, and stability of America’s system of 
self-government…shall not be used” in the construction of any 
federal buildings going forward.2 When holding design 
competitions for new public buildings, the General Services 
Administration would henceforth, according to the draft, convene 
panels “composed of the public” to evaluate proposed designs. 
Among those to be expressly excluded from these panels were 
“artists, architects, engineers, [and] art or architecture critics.”3  
 
 The General Services Administration (“GSA”) is an 
executive agency that is likely entirely subject to these kinds of 
presidential whims.4 Proponents of a weaker unitary executive 
theory believe that the framers did not constitutionalize 
presidential control over all that we now think of as administration, 
and that Congress may insulate certain functions from the 
President by protecting agency officials with a “good cause” 
discharge standard, but until 2020, the GSA has seldom been seen 
as the kind of agency that required insulation from presidential 
control.5 The GSA is responsible for managing and supporting the 
basic functioning of federal infrastructure, facilitating everything 
from government agencies’ paperclip purchases to the construction 
of new federal courthouses. Many Americans only became aware 
of the awesome power wielded by this agency when Administrator 
Emily Murphy delayed the GSA’s ascertainment of the 2020 
presidential election, preventing President-Elect Joe Biden’s 
administration from beginning its transition for several weeks over 
the objections of Congress.6 
 
 The Guiding Principles for Federal Architecture that have 
controlled at the GSA for the past half century were derived from a 
 
2 Id. at 3. 
3 Id. 
4 40 U.S.C. §301. 
5 See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the 
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
6 See Nicholas Fandos, The head of the G.S.A. spurns a request from Congress 
to be briefed on the transition, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/23/us/the-head-of-the-gsa-spurns-a-request-
from-congress-to-be-briefed-on-the-transition.html. 
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1962 report written by Senator Daniel Moynihan.7 In his capacity 
as Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Office Space, 
Moynihan wrote to then-President Kennedy that it should be the 
policy of the federal government “to provide requisite and 
adequate facilities in an architectural style and form which is 
distinguished and which will reflect the dignity, enterprise, vigor, 
and stability of the American National Government.”8 Trump 
appropriated this quartet of venerable, unobjectionable nouns for 
his executive order, but it is there that the similarities between his 
vision and Moynihan’s end. According to Senator Moynihan,“[i]t 
should be our object to meet the test of Pericles’ evocation to the 
Athenians, which the President commended to the Massachusetts 
legislature in his address of January 9, 1961: ‘We do not imitate—
for we are a model to others.’”9 Moynihan called for major 
emphasis to be placed on “the choice of designs that embody the 
finest contemporary American architectural thought.”10 Exuding 
early-‘60s optimism, the report is confidently forward-looking, 
urging the government to embrace cutting-edge developments in 
both architecture and art by calling for the work of living 
American artists to be incorporated into the design schemes of 
federal buildings whenever possible.11 Moynihan proposes that 
federal architecture celebrate diversity by incorporating design 
elements that reflect “the regional architectural traditions of that 
part of the Nation in which buildings are located.”12 Perhaps most 
importantly, to realize this goal, Moynihan wrote that “[t]he 
development of an official style must be avoided. Design must 
flow from the architectural profession to the Government, and not 
vice versa.”13 Trump’s draft order, by contrast, was backward-
looking, and sought to ensure that design flows from the 
 
7 U.S. GEN. SERV.’S ADMIN., GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR FEDERAL 
ARCHITECTURE, https://www.gsa.gov/real-estate/design-construction/design-
excellence/design-excellence-program/guiding-principles-for-federal-
architecture (last updated Feb. 26, 2019). 
8 Id. 




13 Id.  
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government to the architectural profession. It also explicitly 
favored the regional architectural traditions of some parts of the 
country, calling for “the Spanish colonial and other Mediterranean 
styles generally found in Florida and the American Southwest” to 
be adopted nationwide. 14 This sounded suspiciously like a call for 
all new federal buildings to look like the President’s “winter White 
House,” Mar-a-Lago. While the private Palm Beach club may be 
the President’s “happy place,” it is difficult to imagine this style 
being suitable for, say, a courthouse in Minneapolis.15  
 
 While the Republican-controlled Senate acquitted Trump, 
his administration was soon forced to confront the spread of 
COVID-19 to the United States. Perhaps due to the unprecedented 
social and economic disruptions brought on by the pandemic, the 
“beautification” of America’s buildings ceased to be an immediate 
federal priority. The draft nevertheless drew immediate criticism 
from artists, architects, engineers, and art and architecture critics 
concerned about the order’s eventual implementation.16 The draft 
 
14 See Draft Executive Order supra note 1. 
15 Darlene Superville, With Government Open Again, Trump Heads for Florida, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/62d140ebc1e047b2b010cfad6ce1bc62. 
16 See Press Release, Am. Inst. of Architects, AIA opposes uniform style 
mandates (Feb. 4, 2020) (https://www.aia.org/press-releases/6263517-aia-
opposes-uniform-style-mandates-) (“The AIA strongly opposes uniform style 
mandates for federal architecture. Architecture should be designed for the 
specific communities that it serves, reflecting our rich nation’s diverse places, 
thought, culture and climates. Architects are committed to honoring our past as 
well as reflecting our future progress, protecting the freedom of thought and 
expression that are central to democracy.”); Letter from the Soc’y of 
Architectural Historians to President Trump (Feb. 10, 2020) 
(https://www.sah.org/about-sah/news/sah-news/news-detail/2020/02/06/society-
of-architectural-historians-letter-in-opposition-to-proposed-executive-order-
making-federal-buildings-beautiful-again?_zs=O89gX&_zl=Fe6w1) (“As an 
organization whose members have observed, recorded, and analyzed both 
historic and contemporary architecture since our inception in 1940, we have 
come to understand that most significant public architecture in the United States 
has resulted from the intersection of monumentality, permanence, and aesthetic 
significance and the specific local demands of site and community...the dictation 
of style—any style—is not the path to excellence in civic architecture.”); 
Statement, National Trust for Historic Preservation (Feb. 6, 2020) 
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order’s specification that they be excluded from future 
conversations about federal building projects suggested that, by 
virtue of their special expertise, members of their professions are 
not part of “the public.”17 The alternative vision of “the public” 
promoted by the draft order was a populist one, embodying the 
hostility towards real or imagined “elites” that characterized much 
of the Trump administration’s rhetoric.18   
 
 The order was not officially signed until 10 months later.19 
By then, Trump had lost his bid for reelection to Biden but was 
refusing to concede, spending his dwindling days in office 
tweeting about voter fraud, raising money to—ostensibly—fund a 
series of doomed lawsuits aimed at overturning the election results, 
and issuing controversial pardons for his friends and other 
criminals. When the order was published, it bore the slightly more 
dignified title “Executive Order on Promoting Beautiful Federal 
Civic Architecture,” but remained substantively suffused in 
MAGA nostalgia.20 Where the draft order explicitly prohibited the 




(“We strongly oppose any effort to impose a narrow set of styles for future 
federal projects based on the architectural tastes of a few individuals that will 
diminish, now and for the future, our rich legacy of federal architecture.”); 
Michael Kimmelman, MAGA War on Architectural Diversity Weaponizes Greek 
Columns, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/arts/design/federal-building-
architecture.html (“Greek columns and Italianate windows don’t make a 
building look more American to me.”); but see Justin Davidson, Trump’s 
Classical-Architecture Edict Is Dumb — But Not Worth the Outrage, NEW 
YORK (Feb. 10, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/02/trumps-
classical-architecture-edict-isnt-worth-the-outrage.html (“The White House’s 
proposed architectural edict is a boneheaded idea cooked up by a crackpot cabal 
of ideologues who hate not just modern architecture but modernity itself. Yet on 
the scale of Trump’s iniquities, the move barely registers. This administration’s 
attack on the natural environment is far more dire than anything it could wreak 
on the built environment.”). 
17 See supra note 1 at 3. 
18 Id. 
19 Exec. Order No. 13,967, 85 Fed. Reg. 83,739 (Dec. 18, 2020). 
20 Id. 
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published order merely introduced a number of requirements 
designed to make it especially onerous to build such buildings, 
including the submission of “a detailed explanation of why the 
[General Services] Administrator believes selecting such design is 
justified, with particular focus on whether such design is as 
beautiful and reflective of the dignity, enterprise, vigor, and 
stability of the American system of self-government as alternative 
designs of comparable cost using preferred architecture.”21 Where 
the draft called for panels composed of the non-specialist public in 
addition to a sitting President’s Committee for the Re-
Beautification of Federal Architecture to evaluate new building 
designs, the published order only called for a President’s Council 
on Improving Federal Civic Architecture.22 As described in the 
draft, the only Committee seat reserved for someone with any 
relevant expertise was to be occupied by a member of the U.S. 
Commission of the Fine Arts designated by the President.23 The 
published order held that the Council was to include all seven 
members of the U.S. Commission of the Fine Arts, the Secretary of 
the Commission of Fine Arts, the Architect of the Capitol, and the 
Chief Architect of the GSA.24 The Council was also to include “up 
to 20 additional members appointed by the President from among 
citizens outside the Federal Government.”25 The published order 
did away with much of the draft’s populist rhetoric, though it 
added one curious sentence about ensuring “that architects 
designing Federal buildings serve their clients, the American 
people.”26  
 
 The significant difference between the draft order and 










25 Id.  
26 Id. 
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pretense that architectural “beauty” is in the eye of any beholder 
who is not Trump himself. Members of the U.S. Commission of 
Fine Arts are appointed by the President.27 Members appointed by 
Trump have all been outspoken advocates of the “timelessness” of 
classical architecture.28 The order cleared the way for Trump to 
anoint surrogates who would impose the President’s own much-
maligned taste on the country even after he has gone back to being 
a private citizen.29 
 
  By effectively silencing the vast majority of architects, the 
order also raises freedom of speech concerns. As one commentator 
has argued, “the First Amendment stands as a bulwark against the 
imposition of the subjective tastes of the majority on the 
minority.”30 Trump’s order bust through this bulwark, threatening 
to impose the subjective taste of a very small minority indeed—
Trump alone—on the majority. One can imagine a follow-up 
proclamation calling for all new federal buildings to be decorated 
in twenty-four karat gold leaf. 
 
  Unfortunately, any First Amendment challenge to the 
architecture order would face serious obstacles. As a threshold 
issue, the idea that architecture should qualify as protectable 
speech under the First Amendment is not itself uncontroversial. 
Even if courts found architecture to be protectable in principle, 
Trump’s order, as government speech, would arguably not be 
subject to any First Amendment restrictions. The Supreme Court 
has held that the “[g]overnment is not restrained by the First 
 
27 Exec. Order No. 13,967, 85 Fed. Reg. 83,739 (Dec. 18, 2020). 
28 See, e.g., John J. Miller, Something Lasting, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Sept. 13, 
2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2018/10/01/duncan-stroik-
church-art-architecture/. 
29 See, e.g., David Owen, The Psychological Insights of Trump Tower, NEW 
YORKER (Apr. 10, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/17/the-psychological-insights-
of-trump-tower (describing the marble tiles covering the atrium of Trump Tower 
on Fifth Avenue as “the color of gastrointestinal inflammation”). 
30 Janet Elizabeth Haws, Architecture as Art—Not in My Neocolonial 
Neighborhood: A Case for Providing First Amendment Protection to Expressive 
Residential Architecture, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1625 (2005). 
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Amendment from controlling its own expression.”31 Because the 
federal government cannot invite every architect to build its 
courthouses, it must make choices regarding whom to commission 
and whom not to commission. So long as the government does not 
make its hiring determinations based on impermissible criteria—
race, sex, religion, etc.—the government would likely be 
considered free to use whatever aesthetic criteria it likes for 
selecting architectural proposals. The Supreme Court has held that 
the government is not prohibited from engaging in viewpoint 
discrimination regarding expressive permanent structures installed 
on public property, even those installed on the grounds of 
traditional public fora.32 Accordingly, existing doctrine would 
seem to lend support to the proposition that a building erected on 
public property—even one constructed for the purpose of 
accommodating a public forum—is not itself a public forum, and 
that the government would not therefore be prohibited from 
engaging in viewpoint discrimination regarding the building’s style 
and expressive content.33  
 
 This lack of a clear First Amendment remedy is 
unsatisfying. The government, after all, has a monopoly on the 
authority to erect courthouses, statehouses, and many other 
buildings which should properly be considered the common 
property of all citizens, the people’s houses. These buildings house 
our organs of justice and mechanisms for making our voices heard. 
Even the least glamorous among them—the buildings that house 
our social security administration offices come to mind—host 
those doing the righteous and essential work of ensuring that the 
most vulnerable members of our society are cared for when unable 
to support themselves. Federal architecture should reflect this 
seriousness of purpose. It should reflect the fact that public service 
is a high calling. Most importantly, it should be made apparent by 
our federal architecture that our government is one constituted by 
the people and for the people. As anyone who has spent an 
 
31 Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 
(2000). 
32 See Pleasant Grove City, v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009). 
33 Id. 
56 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 16:2 
  
interminable afternoon at the DMV waiting for one’s number to be 
called knows, when the physical manifestation of state bureaucracy 
is especially unprepossessing, compulsory interactions with 
government officials are unlikely to bolster one’s sense of civic 
pride and “respect.” The dropped ceilings, fluorescent lighting, and 
stained, gray carpeting of such offices embody a certain set of 
values, even if no designer would claim to be making any kind of 
aesthetic statement by utilizing these materials. Nevertheless, such 
choices do speak. They say that we value efficiency above all 
things. They say that the government, as our fiduciary, is not 
spending our hard-earned tax dollars on anything extraneous. They 
say that anything about the nature and quality of our shared built 
environment that is not strictly utilitarian represents waste, a 
decadent expenditure. They say that your money should be in your 
pocket, or being put to work making improvements to your 
personal home on your personal property, not enhancing 
communal spaces. That would be socialist, and (still, apparently) 
nothing could be more un-American than that.  
 
 While this is not the sort of speech the First Amendment 
typically protects, a stronger argument can be made for the 
protection of architecture proper as speech. The Supreme Court has 
not specifically ruled on the question of whether architecture 
should be treated as speech for First Amendment purposes, but 
architecture is without question a form of art, a form that many 
commentators believe deserves protection.34 As John Costonis puts 
it, “[f]or many, architecture and other environmental features 
communicate ideas more effectively than does language.”35 It is 
also important to note that any restriction on architectural speech 
would constitute prior restraint, which has traditionally been able 
to survive a First Amendment challenge “only in exceptional 
 
34 See John J. Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of 
the Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REV. 355, 448 (“If nude barroom-type dancing, 
black armbands, and flags sewn on pants seats may at times be protected as 
‘speech,’ it is unclear why the creative expression of one of the twentieth 
century’s most influential architects is not.”). 
35 Id. at 411. 
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circumstances.”36 The censorship of architectural speech will 
virtually always occur ex ante, when the plans are being approved, 
rather than ex post, by tearing down freshly-built structures 
deemed offensive after the completion of construction. “Any 
system of prior restraints of expression” bears “a heavy 
presumption against its constitutional validity.”37 
 
 Like so many of his executive actions, Trump’s 
architecture order pushed the boundaries of presidential power.38 
These boundaries were always underspecified and have always 
been governed more by norms than by laws.39 While Biden has 
now, mercifully, rescinded the order, a president who promulgated 
an order like “Promoting Beautiful Federal Civic Architecture” at 
the beginning of two terms in office rather than at the very end of 
his one and only term could do incalculable damage to the 
aesthetic and intellectual life of the country.40 While it is no longer 
an imminent threat to the architectural profession and to the public, 
Trump’s order presents a much-needed occasion to examine the 
contours of presidential authority and to reflect upon whether more 
constraints on that authority in this particular area of the law are 
needed. 
 
II. ARCHITECTURE AS ART 
 
 The architect is “a poet who uses not words but building 
materials as a medium of expression.”41 In 1965, the critic Ada 
Louise Huxtable called architecture “the most vital and meaningful 
art of our time.”42 While human beings have been practicing the art 
 
36 Near v. State of Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). 
37 Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). 
38 David A. Graham, The Strangest Thing About Trump’s Approach to 




40 Exec. Order No. 14,018, 86 Fed. Reg. 11,855 (Feb. 24, 2021). 
41 JOHN J. COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS: LAW, AESTHETICS, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 94 (1989). 
42 ADA LOUISE HUXTABLE, ON ARCHITECTURE: COLLECTED REFLECTIONS ON A 
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of architecture since we left the caves, the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries have been an exceptionally dynamic period. The 
early twentieth century saw the birth of modernism, which 
emphasized a break with tradition, scorn for the decorative, and a 
preference for clean lines and streamlined, functional spaces that 
would improve the quality of life for those who spent time inside 
them.43 Many modern architects were explicitly motivated by the 
desire to uplift the working classes through better urban planning 
and design. Prominent modernists including Walter Gropius, Le 
Corbusier, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, and Philip Johnson came 
together to create what came to be known as the “International 
Style,” which favored inexpensive materials that could be mass-
produced in order to provide, among other things, as much 
affordable housing as possible.44 
 
 Brutalism, which Trump singles out for opprobrium in his 
executive order, is a species of modernism characterized by large, 
block-like, geometric structures built using raw materials, most 
commonly exposed concrete.45 Notable Brutalist buildings include 
Rudolph Hall, which houses the Yale School of Architecture in 
New Haven, the J. Edgar Hoover Building in Washington D.C., 
and Boston City Hall. The style, according to one scholar 
“incorporates a radical aesthetic of anti-beauty,” which comes 
across to Trump (and, to be fair, plenty of others) as ugliness.46 
Brutalist architects did not, of course, set out in pursuit of ugliness, 
but rather in pursuit of an honest approach to materials that 
revealed the means of a building’s production.47 Finished concrete 
Brutalist buildings often still bear the imprints of the plywood 
 
CENTURY OF CHANGE 7 (2010). 
43 See Atli Magnus Seelow, Function and Form: Shifts in Modernist Architects’ 
Design Thinking, 6.1 ARTS 1 (2017). 
44 William H. Hordy, The International Style in the 1930s, 24.1 J. OF THE 
SOCIETY OF ARCHITECTURAL HISTORIANS, 10, 10–14 (1965). 
45 See Reyner Banham, The New Brutalism, ARCHITECTURAL REV. (Jul. 27, 
2010) https://www.architectural-review.com/archive/the-new-brutalism-by-
reyner-banham/8603840.article. 
46 Oli Mould, Brutalism Redux: Relational Monumentality and the Urban 
Politics of Brutalist Architecture, 49.3 ANTIPODE, 701, 702 (2016). 
47 Id. at 704. 
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casing used in their construction, openly and permanently 
confessing to the labor that went into the building process.48 In a 
similarly Marxian vein, Brutalist structures are more likely to be 
squat and earthbound than soaring, and have for this reason been 
charged with “denying the spiritual in Man.”49 Where the vaulted 
ceilings of Gothic cathedrals force those who enter to direct their 
attentions upward, heavenward, Brutalist buildings recall us to the 
material world, its limits, inequities, and changeability.  
 
 In the latter part of the twentieth century, modernism gave 
way to postmodernism, which lacked the coherence and 
ideological consistency of modernism.50 Postmodern architecture 
embraced pluralism—its instigators were scavengers and pastiche-
artists, borrowing from historical forms to create new hybrid 
styles.51 As compared with modernism, writes one scholar, “[t]he 
contrast is between perfection and violated perfection.”52 
Postmodern architecture is more likely to allow its seams and 
contradictions to remain visible, to emphasize the distance 
predecessors have fallen short in their quest for utopia.53 More 
formalist than functionalist, postmodern architecture has also been 
seen as more concerned with interrogating its own aesthetic 
language than with creating structures amenable to the flourishing 
of flesh-and-blood human beings.  
 
 The most recent postmodern leap forward may be best 
exemplified by the late, great Iraqi architect Zaha Hadid, whose 
dramatically canted buildings often dispense with right angles 
altogether, and are made possible by new digital technologies and 
advanced building delivery systems that were not available to 
 
48 Id.  
49 Reyner Banham, The New Brutalism, ARCHITECTURAL REV. (Jul. 27, 2010) 
https://www.architectural-review.com/archive/the-new-brutalism-by-reyner-
banham/8603840.article. 
50 PHILLIP JOHNSON & MARK WIGLEY, DECONSTRUCTIVIST ARCHITECTURE 8 
(1988). 
51 HUXTABLE, supra note 38 at 311. 
52 JOHNSON & WIGLEY, supra note 44 at 8. 
53 Id. 
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previous generations.54 Together with colleagues including Peter 
Eisenman, Rem Koolhaas, and Frank Gehry, Hadid developed 
what came to be known as “Deconstructivism.” 55 Characterized 
by, as Huxtable put it, “[s]tructures that defy gravity and common 
sense by looking as if they are about to fall down or fly apart” 
Deconstructivism is the other architectural style that now finds 
itself in the crosshairs of Trump’s order.56 Some scholars see 
Deconstructivism as a response to Constructivism, the technophilic 
communist architectural movement that flourished in the Soviet 
Union in the 1920s and 1930s.57 Others understand 
Deconstructivism to be spiritually allied with deconstruction, the 
roughly contemporaneous mode of philosophical critique 
inaugurated by Jacques Derrida.58 Highly influential, if 
controversial, deconstruction is not a synonym for demolition. 
Rather, deconstruction was fashioned as a rejoinder to Western 
philosophy’s historical overemphasis on what Derrida called the 
“metaphysics of presence.”59 To engage in deconstruction is to 
take apart hitherto uninterrogated unitary concepts such as truth, 
presence, essence, identity, and origin to see how they are 
constructed, to determine what held them together in the first 
place, and to emphasize the crucial role played by absence and 
difference.60 Derrida was a philosopher who drew inspiration from 
linguistics and semiotics, but the political implications of his 
project were significant; deconstruction works to expose the 
ideological assumptions undergirding our lives and helped 
inaugurate a shift in focus from the visible to the invisible, the 
marginal, the silenced, and erased.61 His work made its way to the 
 
54 See Hannah Martin & Nick Mafi, 13 Striking Buildings by Zaha Hadid, 
ARCHITECTURAL DIGEST (Apr. 2, 2019), 
https://www.architecturaldigest.com/gallery/zaha-hadid-greatest-works-
slideshow. 
55 See generally JOHNSON & WIGLEY, supra, at (page number). 
56 HUXTABLE, supra, at 32. 
57 See generally JOHNSON & WIGLEY, supra, at 8. 
58 See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1974). 
59 Id. at 49. 
60 See, e.g.,  DERRIDA, supra note 58.  
61 See Mark Lilla, The Politics of Jacques Derrida, NEW YORK REVIEW OF 
BOOKS (Jun. 25, 1998), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1998/06/25/the-
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American academy via literary criticism, and helped launch such 
fields as cultural studies, feminist studies, gender and sexuality 
studies, and postcolonial studies.62 Obviously, this intellectual 
tradition would not necessarily be legible to someone walking by a 
Deconstructivist building, but it seems unlikely to be purely 
coincidental that the two disfavored architectural styles named by 
name in Trump’s order happen to be historically identified with 
attempts to uplift the poor and otherwise disenfranchised. 
 
 Lest there be any question that architecture is “expressive,” 
the twentieth century also saw the form being pressed into service 
by totalitarian regimes with very particular agendas and very 
specific messages they hoped to send with their state architecture. 
After Trump’s draft order leaked, architectural historians wasted 
no time in pointing out that the neoclassicism Trump favors was 
the style of choice for Albert Speer, official architect of the Nazi 
government.63 Some Trump apologists attacked this line of 
criticism, accusing the left of making yet another knee-jerk Hitler 
comparison.64 In this case, however, the comparison seemed 
strikingly unexaggerated. Linking the Aryan race with the heroic 




63 See Steve Rose, Will Trump make architecture great again? The dark history 
of dictator chic, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/shortcuts/2020/feb/05/trump-wants-
more-neoclassical-buildings-but-dictating-to-architects-has-a-dark-history. 
64 See Andrew Ferguson, Trump’s Beautiful Proposal for Federal Architecture, 
THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 20, 2020). 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/the-case-for-making-federal-
buildings-beautiful-again/606829/.  The Trump Administration faced many 
comparisons to the Nazi regime in 2018 when it separated hundreds of migrant 
children from their parents and caged them at the U.S.’s border with Mexico. 
See Steve Benen, Sessions: Comparing Family-Separation Policy, Nazi 
Germany is an ‘exaggeration,’ MSNBC (Jun. 19, 2018), 
http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/sessions-comparing-family-
separation-policy-nazi-germany-exaggeration; but see Deborah Lipstadt, It’s Not 
the Holocaust, The Atlantic (Jun 22, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/06/holocaust-family-
separation/563480/. 
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Socialist cultural production; Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the 
Will begins with a long shot of the ruins and statuary of ancient 
Greece rising up out of the mists of time.65 The 1936 Olympic 
games in Berlin were stage-managed to suggest the torch being 
passed from the ancient Greeks to the Germans in Riefenstahl’s 
Olympia. The 1937 opening of the Haus der Deutschen Kunst 
(House of German Art) was marked with a procession featuring 
“2000 years of German Culture” going back to the classical era in 
which “the past was reinvented as myth, and as an endorsement of 
the racist ideologies of the present.”66 Nazi architects scorned 
modernism as “degenerate” and opted instead for Doric columns 
and cornices. They built monuments to their “martyrs” modeled on 
ancient Greek tombs, embracing the tragic view of life articulated 
in Attic drama.67 National Socialist architecture was “an 
architecture that found its ultimate meaning in the celebration of 
death and sacrifice.”68 Hitler himself, dreaming of the thousand-
year Reich, was partial to Roman architecture and its associations 
with empire.69 Like any art form, architecture can convey meaning 
and embody values. Architecture can trace visions of utopia or 
reflect unfathomable hate. 
 
 The American legal system recognizes architectural works 
as one of eight categories of “works of authorship” under the 1990 
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (“AWCPA”).70 The 
statutory definition of an architectural work is “the design of a 
building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, 
including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work 
includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and 
composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not 
include individual standard features.”71 The AWCPA amended the 
 
65 TRIUMPH OF THE WILL (Reichsparteitag-Film 1935). 
66 Ian Boyd Whyte, National Socialism, Classicism, and Architecture, in 
BRILL’S COMPANION TO THE CLASSICS, FASCIST ITALY AND NAZI GERMANY 
404, 417 (Helen Roche & Kyriakos Demetrious, eds., 2018). 
67 Id. at 408. 
68 Id. at 407. 
69 Id. at 425. 
70 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2018). 
71 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
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Copyright Act of 1976, which contained no special provision for 
architecture, only a general “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works” category.72 This was found by Congress to be 
insufficient.73 The legislative history reveals that Congress passed 
the AWCPA because it found architecture to be “a form of artistic 
expression that performs a significant societal purpose, 
domestically and internationally.”74 Creating a dedicated category 
for architecture also brought the United States into compliance 
with the terms of the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, the “world’s most important copyright 
convention,” which today has 179 signatory countries.75 The 
House Report on the AWCPA states that the purpose of making 
architectural works protectible was to promote “the progress of 
architectural innovation,”76 a goal consistent with copyright law’s 
constitutional mandate to “promote the progress of science and the 
useful arts.”77 The House Report further states that “[a]rchitecture 
plays a central role in our daily lives, not only as a form of shelter 
or as an investment, but also as a work of art. It is an art form that 
performs a very public, social purpose. As Winston Churchill is 
reputed to have once remarked,” the Report continues, “‘We shape 
our buildings and our buildings shape us.’”78  
 
III. ART AS SPEECH 
 
 While among laypeople it is generally accepted, even taken 
as self-evident, that art is unique in its expressive capacities, art is 
not special in the realm of First Amendment law. Amy Adler finds 
the status of art as speech under the First Amendment to be 
“surprisingly uncertain.”79 As Ramon Maroz puts it, “while the 
 
72 See David E. Shipley, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act at 
Twenty: Has Full Protection Made A Difference?, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1 (2010). 
73 See id. 
74 H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 5 (1990). 
75 H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 6 (1990). 
76 H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 18 (1990). 
77 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8. 
78 H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 12 (1990). 
79 Amy Adler, Art’s First Amendment Status: A Cultural History of The Masses, 
50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 687, 710 (2018). 
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freedom of artistic creativity has indeed received 
constitutional protection, the U.S. Supreme Court has neither 
distinguished artistic freedom from other forms of expression nor 
given any meaning to the term ‘art speech.’”80 While different 
circuits and different judges may be more or less attuned to the 
singular role artistic expression plays in social development, there 
is no official consensus that all art should receive stricter 
protection than any other type of speech under the First 
Amendment, leading some to argue that “the role of artistic 
expression under the First Amendment appears to be 
undervalued.”81  
 
 Some of the Supreme Court’s most useful pseudo-
definitions of “art speech” are negative formulations; the Court has 
on occasion held that such-and-such expression or behavior is not 
entitled to First Amendment protection because it is not art, which 
unquestionably is entitled to First Amendment protection.82  
 
 In Miller v. California, for example, the Court essentially 
defined art speech as that which is not obscene, or that which does 
not portray “hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the 
ensuing commercial gain.”83 Marvin Miller had been convicted of 
violating a California obscenity law for conducting a mass mailing 
campaign of brochures advertising books consisting of 
pornographic images.84 He brought an action alleging that the law 
violated the First Amendment. The Court upheld the conviction, 
finding that “obscene material is unprotected by the First 
Amendment,” but confining the scope of obscenity regulation to 
“works which depict or describe sexual conduct.”85 The Court 
further clarified that “[a] state offense must also be limited to 
 
80 Raman Maroz, The Freedom of Artistic Expression in the Jurisprudence of the 
United States Supreme Court and Federal Constitutional Court of Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis, 35 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 341, 346 (2017). 
81 Id. 
82 See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. Of Bos., 515 
U.S. 557, 569 (1995); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
83 Miller, 413 U.S. at 35. 
84 Id. at 18. 
85 Id. at 23–24. 
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works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in 
sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and 
which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.”86 To determine whether the work in 
question satisfied these three highly subjective criteria, the Court 
advised future triers of fact to consider “the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards.”87 The “lacking 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” formulation 
replaced the “utterly without redeeming social value” test 
advanced in the 1966 case, Memoirs v. Massachusetts.88 According 
to Miller, work that has artistic value, but perhaps only “serious” 
artistic value, whatever that means, is entitled to First Amendment 
protection.89 
 
 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group 
of Boston addressed art speech in somewhat greater specificity, and 
with considerably more nuance.90 The case concerned a Saint 
Patrick’s Day parade organized by a private veterans group that 
refused to allow the Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston 
(“GLIB”) to march with them.91 GLIB responded by bringing an 
action alleging a violation of the state public accommodations law, 
which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.92 The parade’s organizers replied that compelling them 
to accept GLIB’s participation in the parade would constitute a 
violation of their right to the freedom of speech.93 The lower court 
sided with GLIB, finding impermissible discrimination in the 
group’s exclusion.94 The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that 
the parade constituted protectible expression, and that applying 
Massachusetts’s law to such expressive activity would “require 
speakers to modify the content of their expression to whatever 
 
86 Id. at 24. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 24–25. 
89 Id. 
90 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 557. 
91 Id. at 559. 
92 Id. at 561. 
93 Id. at 564. 
94 Id. at 565. 
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extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with messages of 
their own”95 The Court reasoned that, especially on a public 
street—since time immemorial a place where people have gathered 
to express their views—people should be free from state 
interference in the content of their speech.96  
 
In analyzing the status of the parade as expression entitled 
to First Amendment protection, the Court said that “[t]he protected 
expression that inheres in a parade is not limited to its banners and 
songs…for the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words 
as mediums of expression.”97 Various kinds of symbolism, the 
Court noted, could also convey ideas.98 “[A] narrow, succinctly 
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, 
which if confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized 
message,’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting 
of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky 
verse of Lewis Carroll.”99 What these three examples have in 
common is their medium-specificity.100 These works or bodies of 
work all reject the notion that art can be translated across media, 
into discursive language. Pollock’s painting is concerned with the 
nature of paint and gesture; all “meaning” flows from this primary 
exploration. The language of “Jabberwocky” is sensuous, playful, 
intuitive; the words signify not by indexing to familiar dictionary 
definitions, but though rhythm, assonance, and rhyme. Fortunately 
for art, if unfortunately for GLIB, the Hurley holding made it clear 
that the First Amendment protects even so-called “art for art’s 
sake.”101 Art speech is not, or is not necessarily, message-driven 
 
95 Id. at 578. 
96 Id. at 579. 
97 Id. at 569. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 See Clement Greenberg, Jackson Pollock: Inspiration, Vision, Intuitive 
Decision, in JACKSON POLLOCK: INTERVIEWS, ARTICLES, AND REVIEWS 110, 
113 (Pepe Karmel, ed., 1999); see also Charles Wilson, Times like the present: 
de-limiting music in the twenty-first century, in THE ROUTLEDGE RESEARCH 
COMPANION TO MODERNISM IN MUSIC 258, 266 (Björn Heile & Charles Wilson, 
eds., 2019); see also GILLES DELEUZE, THE LOGIC OF SENSE 82 (1990). 
101 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. 





 Lacking a more extensive general jurisprudence of art 
speech, we can look to judicial pronouncements on the First 
Amendment’s interaction with individual works of art and, more 
rarely, judicial pronouncements on particular media or categories 
of artistic expression. 
 
In Kaplan v. California, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
that the visual arts have First Amendment protection.102 The case 
concerned the proprietor of an adult book store’s challenge to a 
California obscenity ordinance that made the sale of pornographic 
books a misdemeanor.103 The book that occasioned the action 
contained no pictures, only “repetitive descriptions of physical, 
sexual conduct, ‘clinically’ explicit to the point of being 
nauseous,” according to Justice Burger.104 The Court hesitated to 
classify the book as obscene and therefore not entitled to First 
Amendment protection under Miller v. California because “[a] 
book seems to have a different and preferred place in our hierarchy 
of values.”105 Ultimately, however, the Court did find that the 
“commercial exposure and sale of obscene materials to anyone, 
including consenting adults, is subject to state regulation.”106 In 
arriving at this conclusion, the Court noted that, like non-obscene 
books, non-obscene “pictures, paintings, drawings, and 
engravings” are protected by the First Amendment.107 
 
 In Massachusetts v. Oakes, the Court entertains the idea of 
modeling as protectable First Amendment speech108. The case 
 
102 Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-120 (1973); see also Hoepker v. 
Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 340, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“visual art is protected 
speech”); see also Berry v. New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Visual 
artwork is as much an embodiment of the artist’s expression as is a written text, 
and the two cannot always be readily distinguished.”). 
103 Kaplan, 413 U.S. at 116. 
104 Id. at 116–117. 
105 Id. at 119. 
106 Id. at 120. 
107 Id. at 119. 
108 Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 590 (1989). 
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concerned a First Amendment challenge to a Massachusetts law 
making it a crime to encourage or permit a child under eighteen 
years of age to pose or perform nude in any book, magazine, 
pamphlet, film, photograph, or picture.109 The plaintiff was facing 
ten years in prison for taking ten photographs of his “partially nude 
and physically mature” fourteen-year old stepdaughter, who was 
attending modeling school at the time of the incident.110 The 
photographs depicted the teenager “sitting, lying, and reclining on 
top of a bar, clad only in a red and white striped bikini panty and a 
red scarf,” which left her breasts fully exposed in all of the 
photographs.111 While the Court remanded the case without 
reaching the substantive First Amendment issues presented, Justice 
Brennan wrote in dissent that “[p]hotography, painting, and other 
two-dimensional forms of artistic reproduction…are plainly 
expressive activities that ordinarily qualify for First Amendment 
protection…And modeling, both independently and by virtue of its 
close association with those activities, enjoys like shelter under the 
First Amendment.”112 
 
 In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court made it clear 
that “[m]usic, as a form of expression and communication, is 
protected under the First Amendment.”113 The plaintiff in the case 
was an antiracist group (“RAR”) that sponsored an annual program 
of speeches and rock music at the Central Park bandshell in 
Manhattan to promote their cause.114 The bandshell happens to 
abut some of the priciest real estate in the world, and over the years 
the city had received numerous complaints from residents that 
RAR used excessive sound amplification during their concerts.115 
RAR also had a history of failing to cooperate with city officials to 
find a volume level that would be an acceptable compromise for 
 
109 Id. at 578–579. 
110 Id. at 580. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 590. 
113 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989). 
114 Id. at 784-785. 
115 Id. at 785. 
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all.116 In advance of their 1984 concert, city officials warned RAR 
that their permit would be revoked if specified volume limits were 
exceeded.117 The limits were exceeded,118 and the following year, 
RAR was denied a permit.119 The city adopted guidelines stating 
that anyone using the bandshell for performances would have to 
use high-quality sound equipment newly purchased by the city, as 
well as a city-employed sound technician.120 RAR found these 
guidelines objectionable, and filed an action against various city 
officials.121 The Court found the bandshell guidelines to be a 
reasonable time, place, or manner restriction, and clarified that the 
city need not prove that its regulation was the least intrusive means 
of furthering its legitimate government interest in noise control.122 
In coming to this conclusion, however, the Court opined 
extensively on the importance of music, “one of the oldest forms of 
human expression.”123 Rulers from those imagined in “Plato’s 
discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own times,” 
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, “have known [music’s] 
capacity to appeal to the intellect and to the emotions and have 
censored musical compositions to serve the needs of the state.  The 
Constitution prohibits any like attempts in our own legal order.”124 
 
 Upholding a “fairness doctrine” requirement that opposing 
views of matters of public concern be given equal time on the radio 
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., the Court found that 
“broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment 
interest.”125 Between 1949 and 1987, the Federal Communications 






120 Id. at 786–787. 
121 Id. at 788. 
122 Id. at 789-790. 
123 Id. at 790. 
124 Id. 
125 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). But see F.C.C. v. 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (“of all forms of communication, it is 
broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection.”). 
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broadcasters the requirement “that discussion of public issues be 
presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues 
must be given fair coverage.”126 This included the requirement that 
if particular individuals or groups were personally attacked on a 
particular program, they must be given the opportunity to respond 
on air.127 When the FCC attempted to compel Red Lion 
Broadcasting to give author Fred Cook an opportunity to respond 
to a personal attack that had been leveled against him on one of its 
radio stations, Red Lion brought an action against the FCC, 
alleging that the regulations abridged their freedom of speech and 
press.128 They argued that the First Amendment protected their 
desire to use their frequencies to broadcast whatever they chose, 
and to exclude whomever they chose from ever using that 
frequency.129 While acknowledging that radio and television were 
entitled to First Amendment protection, the Court found that 
“differences in the new media justify differences in the First 
Amendment standards applied to them.”130 Such newly-available 
technologies as television and radio were capable of producing an 
ever-present cacophony that would “drown[] out civilized private 
speech.”131 Accordingly, “[t]he right of free speech of a 
broadcaster” the Court said, “does not embrace a right to snuff out 
the free speech of others,” and fairness doctrine regulations were 
therefore necessary and appropriate.132 
 
 The Court recognized that film is entitled to protection as 
speech in Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson.133 In that case, the Court 
struck down a New York ordinance permitting the banning of 
motion pictures deemed “sacrilegious” on First Amendment 
grounds.134 Notwithstanding the respondent’s urging that “motion 
pictures possess a greater capacity for evil, particularly among the 
 
126 Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 369. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 386. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 387 
132 Id. 
133 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 497 (1952). 
134 Id.  
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youth of a community, than other modes of expression,” the court 
held that motion pictures are “a form of expression whose liberty is 
safeguarded by the First Amendment.”135 Exhibiting unusual 
sensitivity to the complex ways in which art may “speak,” Justice 
Clark wrote that “[i]t cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a 
significant medium for the communication of ideas. They may 
affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging 
from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle 
shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression.”136 
 
 Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad established that theater 
can claim First Amendment protection.137 The case involved a 
challenge to a municipal theater in Tennessee’s refusal to permit a 
production of the musical Hair to be staged. An anthem of 1960s 
counterculture, Hair expressed contempt for the Vietnam War, 
sexual repression, and the suffocating conformity of mainstream 
American life with scenes incorporating simulated sex acts, drug 
use, and such glib, yet accurate, denunciations of U.S. foreign 
policy as “[t]he War is White people sending Black people to fight 
Yellow people to defend the land they stole from the Red 
people.”138 There was also the famous “nude scene.” Before its 
Broadway opening, the New York Times sent a critic for the 
express purpose of sussing out just exactly how much nudity Hair 
contained. “The first act of the rock musical ends with several 
healthy young men facing front and center in the altogether,” she 
reported.139 “Just how many stark naked males there are and 
whether the girl hippies are equally unclothed has been the subject 
of urgent dispute among those who have been attending previews 
of ‘Hair’ during the last few weeks.”140 Alas, the nude scene was 
staged in semi-darkness, with different cast members disrobing or 
 
135 Id. at 501 
136 Id.  
137 Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975). 
138 JIM SHARMAN, BLOOD AND TINSEL: A MEMOIR, 131 (2008). 
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keeping their clothes on as the spirit moved them from one evening 
to the next, so a definitive answer could not be given.141 Some 
community members found it all rather shocking and distasteful 
when the show came to Chattanooga in 1971. So did Chief Justice 
Burger, who would sneer in posing a hypothetical while dissenting 
from a different opinion the year the case was decided, “assuming 
arguendo that there could be a play performed in a theater by nude 
actors involving genuine communication of ideas,” as if live nudity 
and ideas are self-evidently incompatible.142 Nevertheless, the 
Southeastern Court held the city venue’s denial of permission to be 
unconstitutional prior restraint, and in doing so affirmed that 
theater is entitled to First Amendment protection.143  
 
 More sweepingly, in Schad v. Mount Ephraim, which dealt 
with a municipal zoning ordinance banning live nude dancing, the 
Court found that “[e]ntertainment, as well as political and 
ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs 
broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as 
musical and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment’s 
guarantee.”144 Though not all art is entertainment, and not all 
entertainment is art, the two terms are conflated often enough to 
suggest that the Court’s endorsement of protection here might 
reasonably be interpreted as broadly applicable to the arts in 
general. This is the position of numerous commentators who 
believe that “art speech should be presumptively protected 
expression and generally immune from regulation.”145 Perhaps if 
so many of our key free speech cases were not occasioned by 
disputes involving pornography and nude erotic dancing, which 
“falls within the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s protection,” 
the Court’s jurisprudence in this area would be more robust and the 
 
141 Id. 
142 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 223 (1975). 
143 Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975). 
144 Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981). 
145 Edward J. Eberle, Art As Speech, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (2008); 
see also Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 73 (1996), see also 
Sheldon Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, the 
Sublime and the First Amendment, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 221 (1987). 
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status of art as a type of speech uniquely deserving of protection 
more clear.146 
 
IV. ARCHITECTURE AS SPEECH  
 
 Even assuming that architecture is art, and that art is 
entitled to protection as speech for the purposes of the First 
Amendment, there is nothing talismanic about this status. “Each 
medium of expression, of course, must be assessed for First 
Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may 
present its own problems.”147 While architecture is a form of visual 
art, is it plainly more than merely visual. Like the examples of non-
representational art cited in Hurley, architecture, and particularly 
modern architecture, is untranslatable. What a building “says” 
cannot be communicated by a drawing, or a film, or a concerto. 
Huxtable observed that architects of the late twentieth century in 
particular added a fourth dimension to architecture’s conventional 
definition as a three-dimensional, spatial art: “an aesthetic of 
experiences in time, of responses dependent on the passage from 
one part of the building to another.”148 While any full experience 
of a work of architecture will be time-based, architecture has little 
in common with “live entertainment.” To succeed, a building must 
also “address fundamental concerns—the needs and pleasures of 
the body and spirit—that all great architecture serves and turns into 
art.”149 Because of the basic duty to not only address but protect 
the human body, architects are also accustomed to working within 
the confines of government restrictions on things like travel 
distance to the nearest exit, height and bulk in designated historic 
areas, and earthquake-readiness. Buildings are both functional and 
aesthetic objects, and the most salient feature of any building is 
always going to be whether or not it is able to keep from collapsing 
 
146 City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 278 (2000). 
147 Conrad, 420 U.S. at 557; see also F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 
726, 748 (“We have long recognized that each medium of expression presents 
special First Amendment problems.”). 
148 Ada Louise Huxtable, On Architecture: Collected Reflections on a Century 
of Change, 24 (2008). 
149 Id. at 28. 
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around the heads of the people inside it. For these reasons, and 
because architecture requires so much in the way of resources, 
partnerships with government have long been a crucial part of the 
development of the medium itself. One could even say that state 
sponsorship is the vital, beating heart of architecture. This makes 
architecture quite different from other art forms. As a result, 
architecture is not at all well-served by existing art law doctrine, 
and this is a problem.  
 
 It is within the police power of the state to promote the 
“general welfare,” and as the aesthetic character of a locality has 
been treated as an element of the “general welfare,” architectural 
aesthetics have not infrequently been held to fall within the scope 
of states’ and cities’ police power.150 This treatment of aesthetics is 
a relatively recent phenomenon. Commentators have identified 
three historical stages in judicial treatment of aesthetic regulation, 
the first of which is exemplified by the opinion of a New Jersey 
judge who in 1903 wrote that he could find no case “which holds 
that a man may be deprived of his property because his tastes are 
not those of his neighbors. Esthetic considerations are a matter of 
luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity.”151 During this 
period, courts were wary of the idea that the government’s police 
power extended to aesthetic initiatives.152 During the second 
period, courts upheld aesthetic regulations if they could be tied to 
such traditional state interests as health, safety, or property 
values.153 The third period, in which we find ourselves today, is 
characterized by the greater willingness of courts to uphold 
regulations issued for aesthetic reasons alone.154 Writing for a 
unanimous Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker, Justice Douglas 
captured the ethos of this period in declaring that the values 
 
150 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Reid v. Architectural Bd. Of 
Review, 192 N.E.2d 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963); State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. 
Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970). 
151 City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advert. & Sign Painting Co., 62 A. 
267, 268 (N.J. 1905). 
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represented by the concept of the public welfare “are spiritual as 
well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.”155 It is within the 
legislature’s power, he wrote, “to determine that the community 
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, 
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.”156 
 
 The uninterrogated assumption of Justice Douglas’s 
opinion is that “beauty” is a stable and transcendent virtue. In 
subsequent opinions, the Supreme Court has cautioned that 
“esthetic judgments are necessarily subjective, defying objective 
evaluation, and for that reason must be carefully scrutinized.”157 
While lower courts have readily upheld as constitutional laws that 
regulate architecture on aesthetic grounds alone, jurisprudence in 
this area has been criticized as incoherent.158 “The judiciary has 
failed to discipline the aesthetic regulation system by clearly 
articulating principles of court-applied law as a check on abusive 
or misguided aesthetic initiatives,” Costonis argues.159  
 
 As a result, when the government’s conception of beauty 
comes into conflict with an individual’s, the government tends to 
prevail. Homeowners have discovered this when their plans to 
construct avant-garde dream homes run afoul of local government 
ordinances or the determinations of architectural boards.160 
 
 In State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, for example, the 
Stoyanoffs brought an action alleging that they were deprived of 
their property without due process of law when they were refused a 
building permit for the construction of their proposed 
“ultramodern” residence.161 Their building plan was rejected by the 
Architectural Board of the City of Ladue, which was established to 
 
155 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
156 Id. 
157 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510 (1981). 
158 John J. Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of the 
Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REV. 355, 395-396 (1982). 
159 Id. 
160 See, e.g., Reid v. Architectural Bd. Of Review, 192 N.E.2d 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1963). 
161 State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 307 (Mo. 1970). 
76 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 16:2 
  
foster “appropriate standards of beauty and conformity” in the city, 
and to ensure that “unsightly, grotesque and unsuitable structures, 
detrimental to the stability of value and the welfare of surrounding 
property, structures and residents, and to the general welfare and 
happiness of the community, be avoided.”162 The lot where the 
Stoyanoffs sought to build their house was in a neighborhood 
where “virtually all” of the existing houses were “two-story houses 
of conventional architectural design, such as Colonial, French 
Provincial or English.”163 According to the city, the Stoyanoff’s 
proposed house was “a monstrosity of grotesque design, which 
would seriously impair the value of property in the 
neighborhood.”164 According to the court, it was “to be of a 
pyramid shape, with a flat top, and with triangular shaped windows 
or doors at one or more corners.”165 The Stoyanoffs argued that the 
ordinance establishing the Architectural Board was 
unconstitutional because it empowered the board to permit or deny 
uses of personal property based on impermissible aesthetic criteria. 
 
 Since it was within the police power of a state to pass 
regulations designed to promote the general welfare, the city 
prevailed on the grounds that “[t]he character of the district, its 
suitability for particular uses, and the conservation of the values of 
buildings therein” are “directly related to the general welfare of the 
community.”166 The ordinance establishing the Architectural Board 
was deemed constitutional. Most homeowners who seek to 
distinguish themselves in similar ways fail for similar reasons, but 
overly vague or arbitrary ordinances calling for architectural or 
aesthetic uniformity have been struck down by courts under 
rational basis review.167 
 
162 Id. at 306-307. 
163 Id. at 307. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 308. 
166 Id. at 309. 
167 See, e.g., R.S.T. Builders, Inc. v. Vill. Of Bolingbrook, 489 N.E.2d 1151, 
1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Vill of Olympia Fields, 244 
N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Morristown Road Assoc. v. Mayor, 394 
A.2d 157 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1959); Hankins v. Borough of Rockleigh, 
150 A.2d 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959). 




V. GOVERNMENT SPEECH AND FEDERAL ARCHITECTURE 
 
 Should the federal government undertake to build a 
neoclassical courthouse in the style called for by Trump’s 
executive order, would the government be “speaking” through 
architecture “on its own behalf[?]”168 Or would the government be 
engaging in “viewpoint discrimination in the exercise of public 
authority over expressive activity[?]”169 I believe it would be doing 
both, and in so doing, implicating two bodies of First Amendment 
doctrine that prove imperfectly compatible in the context of 
architectural expression. 
 
 A. Government Speech 
  
 A Trump-style courthouse could be interpreted as a kind of 
government monument, which would render it essentially exempt 
from First Amendment scrutiny as “government speech.” 170 As the 
Supreme Court observed in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 
“[g]overnments have long used monuments to speak to the 
public…A monument, by definition, is a structure that is designed 
as a means of expression. When a government entity arranges for 
the construction of a monument, it does so because it wishes to 
convey some thought or instill some feeling in those who see the 
structure.”171 The issue in Summum was whether the Free Speech 
Clause entitles a private group to insist that a municipality permit it 
to place a monument in a city park alongside other donated 
monuments. The park in question had eleven privately donated 
permanent displays, including a Ten Commandments monument. 
 
168 Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 
2250 (2015). 
169 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 601 (1998) (Souter, J., 
Dissenting). 
170 See Columbia Broadcast. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 
139, n. 7 (1973) (“[T]he Government’s own speech…is exempt from First 
Amendment scrutiny.”). See also Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (“Government is not restrained by the 
First Amendment from controlling its own expression.”). 
171 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470, (2009). 
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Summum, a religious organization that, most notably, practices 
Modern Mummification™,172 attempted to donate their own 
monument.173 Summum’s president wrote to the mayor of Pleasant 
Grove requesting permission to erect a stone monument “which 
would contain the Seven Aphorisms of Summum and be similar in 
size and nature to the Ten Commandments monument” already on 
display in the park.174 The City denied the request, explaining that 
it only accepted monuments that “either (1) directly relate to the 
history of Pleasant Grove, or (2) were donated by groups with 
longstanding ties to the Pleasant Grove community.”175 Summum 
filed an action alleging that the City had violated the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment by accepting the Ten 
Commandments monument, but rejecting Summum’s.176 
 
 The Court found for the City, concluding that, like 
“government-commissioned and government-financed 
monument[s]” installed on public property, “privately financed and 
donated monuments that the government accepts and displays to 
the public on government land” constitute “government speech.”177 
Because in curating theses monuments, the City was effectively 
speaking on its own behalf, the First Amendment was not 
implicated.178 “If governments must maintain viewpoint neutrality 
in selecting donated monuments,” Justice Alito wrote for the 
plurality, “they must either prepare for cluttered parks or face 
pressure to remove longstanding and cherished monuments.”179 
From a purely practical perspective, since the government cannot 
in all situations be expected to say “yes” to everyone, the 
government must be able to say “no” without triggering the First 
 
172 See MUMMIFICATION, A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION, 
https://www.summum.us/mummification/philosophy.shtml (last visited May 4, 
2020). 
173 Summum, 555 U.S. at 1129.  
174 Id. at 1129-30. 
175 Id. at 1130. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 1133. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 1128. 
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Amendment’s restrictions on viewpoint discrimination. 180 
 
 This permissive government speech doctrine congealed in 
Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, a 2015 case in 
which the Texas Divisions of the Sons of Confederate Veterans 
filed suit against the chairman of the board of the Texas 
Department of Motor Vehicles over its refusal to accept a proposed 
specialty license plate design featuring a Confederate flag.181 The 
Court held that Texas’s specialty license plates were government 
speech, the content of which the state was free to restrict as it saw 
fit.182 “When government speaks,” Justice Breyer wrote for the 
majority, “it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from 
determining the content of what it says.”183 If the Free Speech 
Clause were interpreted as barring government from making such 
determinations, “it is not easy to imagine how government would 
function,” said the Court. 184 
 
 The Second Circuit’s lamentable opinion in Serra v. United 
States General Services Administration suggests that architects 
would be virtually powerless to prevent the destruction of their 
works should the GSA have taken Trump’s order as a cue to begin 
demolishing modern buildings like the San Francisco Federal 
Building or United States courthouses in Buffalo, Austin, or 
Cleveland and replacing them with antebellum architecture that 
reminds us all of when America was truly “great.”185 A few years 
after the GSA had installed artist Richard Serra’s commissioned, 
site-specific sculpture Titled Arc in Manhattan’s Federal Plaza, the 
agency caved to public pressure and announced that the sculpture 
would be removed.186 Tilted Arc was a 12-foot high and 120-foot 
 
180 Id.; see also U.S. v. American Library Ass’n, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 2297, 2306 
(2003). 
181 Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2239, 
2243-2244 (2015). 
182 Id. at 2245. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 2242 (citing Summum, 555 U.S. at 460). 
185 See Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988). 
186 Id. at 1047. 
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long, gently-bending arc of steel.187 The monumental sculpture 
bisected the Plaza, and some federal employees who worked in the 
adjacent offices were annoyed that they had to walk around it on 
their lunch breaks.188 Serra brought suit, alleging that the 
sculpture’s removal would violate his freedom of expression under 
the First Amendment.189 To move the sculpture, Serra explained, 
would be to destroy it, to mutilate its meaning.190 As a site-specific 
work, Titled Arc had been “conceived and created in relation to the 
particular conditions of a specific site.”191 In an opinion that does 
not bode well for the protectability of architectural speech, the 
Second Circuit effectively held that site-specific work is not 
entitled to First Amendment protection.192 All architecture, after 
all, is site-specific art. 
 
 Applying reasoning that would likely not be accepted post-
Hurley, the Serra court said that relocating Tilted Arc would not 
preclude Serra from communicating his ideas in other ways: 
“Notwithstanding that the sculpture is site-specific and may lose its 
artistic value if relocated,  Serra is free to express his artistic and 
political views through the press and through other means that do 
not entail obstructing the Plaza.”193 The court also determined that 
since Serra had “already had six years to convey his message 
through the sculpture’s presence in the Plaza” and since “the First 
Amendment protects the freedom to express one’s views, not the 
freedom to continue speaking forever, the relocation of the 
sculpture after a lengthy period of initial display does not 
significantly impair Serra’s right to free speech.”194 This 
conclusion shows how sorely in need American jurisprudence is of 
a coherent art speech doctrine, for while it might be appropriate to 
 
187 Id. 
188 New York Public Radio Archives & Preservation, Richard Serra’s Tilted 
Arc, WNYC (Feb. 21, 1985), https://www.wnyc.org/story/richard-serras-tilted-
arc/. 
189 Serra, 847 F.2d at 1048. 
190 Id. at 1047. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 1050. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
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say to protestors occupying a public space night and day for weeks 
on end that the First Amendment does not entitle them to go on 
speaking forever, art like Serra’s is built to last, to “speak” as its 
steel rusts and changes color over time, as it alters pedestrians’ 
relationships to surrounding streets and structures, as it shades 
people in the summer and shelters them from wind and sleet in the 
winter.195 
 
 The second rationale offered by the Second Circuit, 
however, has only been buttressed by Summum, Walker, and other 
recent government speech cases.196 The Serra court said that, even 
if site-specific work were entitled to protection, “the First 
Amendment has only limited application in a case like the present 
one where the artistic expression belongs to the Government rather 
than a private individual.”197 Since Tilted Arc was federal property, 
commissioned by the GSA and sited on federal property, the GSA 
was free to dispose of it as it saw fit.198 The “GSA, which is 
charged with providing office space for federal employees, may 
remove from its buildings artworks that it decides are aesthetically 
unsuitable for particular locations.”199 The government’s interest in 
controlling its property prevailed over the First Amendment rights 
of artists like Serra.200 
 
 All of this suggests that artists or architects commissioned 
to create work on federal land do so at their own risk. The Serra 
court did leave open the possibility for a viewpoint discrimination 
challenge when it came to government-commissioned works of art, 
noting that “[e]ven where, as here, the removal of an artwork does 
not restrict the artist's free speech because the work is owned by 
the Government, it is still possible that the Government's broad 
 
195 See Waller v. City of New York, 34 Misc. 3d 371, 375, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011). 
196 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470, (2009); Walker v. 
Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2239, 2243-2244 
(2015); Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., Fla., 806 F.3d 1070, 1073 (11th 
Cir. 2015); O’Brien v. Vill. of Lincolnshire, 955 F.3d 616, 627 (7th Cir. 2020). 
197 Serra, 847 F.2d at 1048. 
198 Id. at 1051. 
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200 Id. at 1049. 
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discretion to dispose of its property could be exercised in an 
impermissibly repressive partisan or political manner.”201 
However, unless a work of art openly and explicitly communicated 
its “message,” and that meaning or message was unmistakably 
partisan or political, it is difficult to imagine such a viewpoint 
discrimination challenge being successful on these terms. Since 
most works of art and architecture, particularly modern art and 
architecture, are more coy than this, they stand or fall at the 
pleasure of the General Services Administration. 
 
 B. Censoring Architects 
 
 The Court wrestled with the problem of viewpoint 
discrimination vis-à-vis arts funding in National Endowment for 
the Arts v. Finley, when four performance artists brought an action 
alleging that the National Endowment for the Arts (“NEA”) had 
violated their First Amendment rights by denying them grants.202 
The artists challenged the law that directed the Chairperson of the 
NEA to “tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency 
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American 
public” in adjudicating grant applications.203 “Decent” and 
“respectful,” would not be among the words anyone familiar with 
the work of the named plaintiff Karen Finley would use to describe 
her performances. In her aggressively feminist one-woman shows, 
Finley often took her clothes off and smeared food on her body to 
represent the violation of women.204 Conservative lawmakers 
objected to the idea of taxpayer dollars funding such 
“obscenity.”205 Most of those leading the culture war against 
Finley’s work—prominently Republican Senator Jesse Helms from 
 
201 Id. at 1050. 
202 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 576 (1998). 
203 Id.  
204 Marcelle Clements, Karen Finley’s Rage, Pain, Hate and Hope, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jul. 22, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/22/theater/theater-karen-
finley-s-rage-pain-hate-and-hope.html. 
205 Michael Oreskes, Senate Votes to Bar U.S. Support Of ‘Obscene or Indecent’ 
Artwork, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 27, 1989), 
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North Carolina—had never seen it. Had they, it would had to have 
become clear that the last thing Finley wanted to do was appeal to 
any prurient interest in sex. We Keep Our Victims Ready, one of 
the performances that earned Finley her notoriety, was inspired by 
the story of Tawana Brawley, a sixteen-year-old African-American 
girl who was found in a trash bag in upstate New York, dazed, 
semi-conscious and covered in human excrement after having 
been, she said, raped by a group of white police officers.206 In the 
piece that grew out of her distress at hearing Brawley’s story, 
Finley smeared her body with chocolate because, as she said 
reflecting on the piece years later, “I’m a woman and women are 
usually treated like shit.”207 Then Finley covered herself with red 
candy hearts because, she explained, “after a woman is treated like 
shit, she becomes more loveable.”208 After the hearts, Finley 
covered herself with bean sprouts, “which smelled like semen and 
looked like semen—because after a woman is treated like shit, and 
loved for it, she is jacked off on.”209 Finally, she spread tinsel all 
over her body, “like a Cher dress—because,” she said, “no matter 
how badly a woman has been treated, she’ll still get it together to 
dress for dinner.”210 The performance was confrontational, 
upsetting, and explicit, but if it invited a sexual gaze, it did so only 
to indict the impulse to sexualize a woman in pain, to sexualize 
women’s pain generally. The NEA’s “decency” requirement was a 
convenient mask for misogyny. It also gave cover to 
homophobia—the other three members of the “NEA Four” were 
gay and their work frequently dealt with issues of queer identity.211  
 
 Regrettably, the Court sided with the NEA, finding no 
substantial risk that the application of the “decency” law would 
lead to the suppression of speech, and observing that “when the 
 
206 KAREN FINLEY, A DIFFERENT KIND OF INTIMACY: THE COLLECTED WRITINGS 
OF KAREN FINLEY, 83 (2000). 
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Government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the 
consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally severe.”212 
The Government “may allocate competitive funding according to 
criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of 
speech or a criminal penalty at stake,” the Court held.213 
Prefiguring the logic of Summum, Justice O’Connor wrote for the 
majority that “it would be impossible to have a highly selective 
grant program without denying money to a large amount of 
constitutionally protected expression…absolute neutrality is 
simply inconceivable.”214 However, she continued, “if subsidy 
were ‘manipulated’ to have a ‘coercive effect,’ then relief could be 
appropriate.”215 
 
 In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia took the position 
that manipulating the criteria for subsidy to have a coercive effect 
would in fact be just fine. “Congress,” after all, “did not abridge 
the speech of those who disdain the beliefs and values of the 
American public, nor did it abridge indecent speech.”216 He 
continued, “[t]hose who wish to create indecent and disrespectful 
art are as unconstrained now as they were before the enactment of 
this statute. Avant-garde artistes such as respondents remain 
entirely free to epater les bourgeois; they are merely deprived of 
the additional satisfaction of having the bourgeoisie taxed to pay 
for it.”217  
 
 Reserving judgment on whether Scalia’s assessment 
reflects an accurate understanding of the material conditions of 
performance artists’ lives, it is clear that this argument cannot be 
translated for architects. While it is true that a performance artist 
could, in theory, perform a scrappy, jerry-built version of her show 
in a public park or a bar with no costumes, props, lights, or 
amplified sound, all of which cost money, architects cannot engage 
 
212 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 589 (1998). 
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in the same sort of guerilla art-making. Large-scale architectural 
projects cannot happen without the government getting involved—
architects cannot create without the government issuing the 
appropriate building permits. An architect also requires far more in 
the way of resources to perform the basic work of creation than a 
performance artist who uses her body as medium or a writer who 
requires only a pen and paper. 
 
 This is true for both privately-commissioned projects and 
government-commissioned ones. The architect cannot create 
without the funding for workers, glass, and steel. Frank Lloyd 
Wright lamented this necessary entwinement with the apparatus of 
commerce, saying that because of the practical compromises he is 
required to make in order to create, the architect “is not quite like 
his brother the artist,” who can be quite prolific while 
simultaneously existing in a state of perpetual hostility towards 
commerce.218 Instead, “the architect, the master of creative effort 
whose province it was to make imperishable record of the noblest 
in the life of his race in his time...has been caught in the 
commercial rush and whirl…He has dragged his ancient 
monuments to the market places…He has degenerated to a 
fakir.”219 When it comes to federal buildings, the government of 
course holds all the cards. Even a stratospherically wealthy 
architect cannot build a courthouse that will serve as anything 





 Architects require government subsidy in order to create 
public buildings, which are the property of the public, but also 
works of art that constitute the expressive speech of individual 
artists. The creation of an official architectural style is tantamount 
to the manipulation of subsidy to have a “coercive effect,” which 
the Supreme Court has indicated could be grounds for relief in 
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First Amendment challenges.220 Notwithstanding Biden’s recision 
of “Promoting Beautiful Federal Civic Architecture,” the order’s 
First Amendment implications are disturbing. The president should 
not have the power to hold an entire major art form hostage, and no 
nation’s shared built environment should be so vulnerable to the 








220 Finley, 524 U.S. at 587. 
